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ABSTRACT
Acknowledging the realities and responsibilities of power is a precondition to using it wisely.
The claim that there has been a shift in power away from the formal providers of education
towards the individual consumer is one that needs closer investigation.
This paper uses the mathematics of cooperative multiperson game theory to analyse the
relative strengths of the various representative groupings on three different models of school
governing bodies. Only a basic knowledge of mathematics is assumed as the various coalitions
are analysed and compared, and conclusions drawn about the relative power of major and minor
factions. Voting strategies, suggested payoffs for winning coalitions and implications for
committee-forming are fully examined.
The paper is based on the author’s direct experience of school amalgamations in the border
region of Ireland. An extended consideration of the theory of voting in multiperson games can
be found in his book Decision-Making and Game Theory (2002, Cambridge University Press).
BACKGROUND
There is a tendency among some researchers in education to analyse power
only from the perspective of how participants perceive it. This is legitimate
insofar as it represents one important aspect of governance, but it can
obfuscate the reality of having and using power, however it is perceived.
Recently, some authors (Donnelly, 2000) have described a dramatic shift in
the balance of power away from the formal providers of education towards the
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7 individual consumer, although the extent to which parents and students are
active participants in education, as opposed to passive recipients of it, has not
been fully determined. It could be argued, for example, that although society
has become more actively consumerist in economic terms, it remains
doggedly passive in matters political and educational.
Certainly, ethnographic research on school governance provides a valuable
insight into how different stakeholders perceive the extent of their power,
particularly in relation to that of their counterparts in other institution types,
but it does not address the question of how actual power is distributed. It is an
important question. In Northern Ireland, for example, fair employment
legislation does not apply to the appointment of teaching staff, so boards of
governors have considerable power over school decision-making, and the only
check on the exercise of this authority is the relative distribution of influence
among the parties represented on the boards.
In 1993, following some years as a head teacher, the author led an
amalgamation of two secondary schools from different traditions in a
community on the Irish border, in the course of which a new model for school
governance (in the Republic of Ireland) was developed. The exercise was
widely acknowledged to have been a success and the author subsequently
acted as consultant to similar rationalisations in other areas.
From first-hand experience of initial and developing reactions to these
various restructurings, and from interviews with protagonists from boards at
other schools and been granted access to minutes of meetings, it became
apparent that different factions had different experiences of the extent to
which their expectations of power had been met by their assigned voting
strengths. For one political representative, the restructuring became:
. . . . . a major disappointment. [As a] democratically elected representa-
tive, [he] came to feel like a spectator. [Participation on the board]
became a complete waste of time.
Typically, parents and teachers expressed themselves content at the school-
level restructuring, but became disappointed and perplexed at their lack of
influence at board level:
The school is good. The staff is happy enough and the principal is fair
with the two staffs, but the Board is a washout. It’s my fault in some ways
because I pushed it. I thought we’d have an influence, but we don’t.
I don’t know why. We just lose every important vote – early closings, the
new posts, the ‘Vpship’, all that. [Teacher]
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7 And:
By the time the chairman lets us speak, it’s all over. The others have
stitched it up. I don’t know if he does it deliberately . . . he knows how
to manipulate a meeting. I suppose that’s what comes of being a
politician for thirty years! We tried different tactics, but he calls the
speakers in the same way every month – when it’s important anyway.
[Parent]
Even a representative of a majority (church) faction had reservations:
In terms of fulfilling the pastoral and spiritual needs of the community, I
have no doubt that the school and its staff are doing their best and have
been largely successful. But I would have concerns on account of our
lack of influence on the board, to be frank. This is not to say . . . that I
am unhappy.
Clearly, there is some disparity between the expectation of power among
parties to a restructuring and what transpires to be the reality of voting
strength. This paper is an attempt to explain that disappointment. It is a game
theoretic exposition of the concepts that underpin the distribution of power in
multiperson interactions. As such, it is of course a simplification of what
practitioners (such as the author) know to be the reality of managing schools
today. In the course of everyday headship, most decisions are made without
recourse to formal voting. However, the decisions that are made in committee
are often strategic ones and therefore of critical importance to the develop-
ment of the school. For that reason it is important that the distribution of power
in committee-like structures is properly understood. Awareness is often what
separates a failing manager from a successful one.
Three different models of school governance are described below. They are
loosely based on school types in Northern Ireland so that the reader has a sense
of a situation in which voting conflict is realistic and pervasive, rather than
artificial and occasional. However, the subsequent analysis is in no way
peculiar to these models or to that setting. They merely serve to illustrate the
principles involved.
Model A: Voluntary Maintained Secondary Schools
Voluntary Maintained schools in Northern Ireland are mostly non-selective
Roman Catholic schools which receive funding from central government. The
Roman Catholic church had originally refused to cede schools to the state,
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7 but accepted the ‘‘maintained’’ arrangement as a result of financial pressures
in the 1970s. Voluntary Maintained schools typically have the following
representations on their boards:
 4 ‘‘trustees’’ (Roman Catholic church representatives);
 2 Education and Library Board representatives (ELB) [An Education and
Library Board is the equivalent of a local education authority];
 1 parent representative;
 1 teacher representative;
 1 representative from the Department of Education, Northern Ireland
(DENI).
Model B: Controlled Secondary Schools
Controlled Secondary schools in Northern Ireland are mostly non-selective
Protestant state schools, ceded under the 1930 Education Act and financed by
the state. Although not all controlled schools are Protestant (e.g., Controlled
Integrated schools) and not all are non-selective (e.g., Controlled Grammar
schools), the majority of them typically have the following representations on
their boards:
 4 ‘‘transferors’’ (Protestant church representatives);
 2 Education and Library Board representatives (ELB);
 2 parent representatives;
 1 teacher representative.
Model C: The Rest: Out-Of-State, Integrated and Voluntary
Grammar Schools
Finally, there are Voluntary Grammar schools (Roman Catholic and Protestant),
Integrated schools (Grant Maintained, Independent and Controlled), and
schools on the southern side of the Irish border attended by children from
Northern Ireland. Naturally, no single model board exists for all of the above,
even in one category (for example, Controlled Integrated schools have church
nominees; Grant Maintained Integrated schools do not), but a typical manage-
ment board for an out-of-state school might consist of:
 3 Education and Library Board (or the equivalent) nominees;
 3 parent representatives;
 2 majority religious representatives;
 1 minority religious representative;
 2 teacher representatives.
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7 ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT REPRESENTATION
Irrespective of religious affiliation or constitution, schools everywhere have
become more complex organisations as a result of the increased participation
of stakeholders. This has manifested itself in a proliferation of committee-like
structures, such as boards of governors, which mediate between society and
the organisation. Representation on these committees usually reflects some
kind of proportional factional entitlement to power and many assumptions
about the relative voting strengths of factions on such committees are
frequently made. Take the case of the Model C school described above. At first
sight, it appears that the voting power of the majority religious body is twice
that of the minority religious body. Similarly, the ELB and parent factions are
assumed to be 50% more ‘‘powerful’’ than the teaching or majority religious
bodies. These casual assumptions are dangerous on two counts. Firstly, they
are simply wrong; and secondly, they support an illusion of participative
democracy and empowerment that distracts from the need to bring about
fundamental change. The advantage of a game theoretic approach is that it can
model majority voting situations such as exist on school governing boards, so
that these inherent fallacies become apparent.
BACKGROUND IN GAME THEORY
Coalitions and Factions
A board of governors can be regarded as a cooperative multiperson game,
similar to a weighted majority game (Colman, 1982), where coalitions are free
to form and disintegrate as the agenda changes. A board of governors consists
of ‘‘factions’’ (the term is not intended to indicate any belligerence) and a
‘‘coalition’’ is defined as one or more of these factions voting together, by
agreement or by chance.
Coalitions come in different sizes.
 The term ‘‘single’’ coalition is used to describe a coalition consisting of one
faction only, although of course it is not strictly a partnership.
 A ‘‘grand’’ coalition is defined as one that contains all factions on the board.
 A ‘‘winning’’ coalition is one that commands a majority of members’ votes.
 A ‘‘minimal’’ coalition is one that cannot suffer any defection without
losing its majority.
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7  A faction is defined as ‘‘pivotal’’ to its coalition if it turns the coalition from
a losing one into a winning one by virtue of its vote; and as ‘‘critical’’ if its
withdrawal causes that coalition to change from a winning one to a losing
one. (For example, in the winning coalition formed by the ELB, teacher and
majority religious factions, all three groups are critical, but only the majority
religious faction – the last one coalescing – is pivotal.)
 A ‘‘null’’ coalition is a coalition consisting of no faction and is ignored
throughout this paper.
Underlying Assumptions: Sincerity, Completeness and Transitivity
By their very nature, committees often have to choose one course of action
from several alternatives according to a set of formal principles designed to
ensure ‘‘fair’’ outcomes, like majority voting (assumed in this paper). A tacit
understanding underlying these principles is that voting is ‘‘sincere’’ and
along self-interest lines, that is, that factions always vote for the choice they
prefer, and that coalitions have not been pre-arranged. This corresponds to
what is known in game theory as ‘‘maximax’’ strategy, where a player opts
for the best of all possible outcomes, ignoring less favourable ones that
are equally possible. Factions are also assumed to be aware of their own and
each other’s payoffs and to coalesce sequentially in full knowledge of what has
gone before. Voting is therefore assumed to be by open declaration, not secret
ballot.
Other axioms, like those of ‘‘completeness’’ and ‘‘transitivity,’’ also under-
pin the principles of committee voting. Completeness refers to the assumption
that a preference is real and irreversible, that is factions that prefer ‘‘Choice X’’
over ‘‘Choice Y’’ do not also prefer ‘‘Choice Y’’ over ‘‘Choice X.’’ Transitivity
assumes a consistent hierarchy of preferences, that is factions that prefer
‘‘Choice X’’ over ‘‘Choice Y’’ and ‘‘Choice Y’’ over ‘‘Choice Z,’’ necessarily
prefer ‘‘Choice X’’ over ‘‘Choice Z.’’
Two measurements of power, the Shapley value and the Shapley-Shubik
index, will now be developed using the principles outlined above. These
indices calculate the distribution of power among factions on committees and
will be used to analyse in turn the three specific cases of Maintained (Model
A), Controlled (Model B) and Out-of-state (Model C) boards of governors.
While only a basic level of mathematics is assumed for the derivation of the
two power indices that follows, those readers with an aversion to mathematics
may skip to the sections on analysis, noting only Equations (3) and (4) en
passant.
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7 The Shapley Value
The Shapley value, introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, rates each faction
according to its a priori power, that is in proportion to the value added to
coalitions by that faction joining it. Suppose a board of governors, B, has n
factions or ‘‘players’’ (groups of members) and some of them vote together to
form a coalition C. Suppose an individual faction of C is denoted by fi and the
size of the coalition C is s. Then
B  ff1; f2; f3; . . . : : fng; C  ff1; f2; . . . : : fi . . . : : fsg;
C is a subset of B, not ; (the empty set).
Clearly, fi has (sÿ 1) partners, selected from (nÿ 1) factions. Therefore,
there are
nÿ 1!
sÿ 1!nÿ 1 ÿ sÿ 1!
ways of re-arranging the coalition partners of i. The reciprocal of this
expression can be written
sÿ 1!nÿ s!
nÿ 1!
and is the probability of each such selection.
Assuming all sizes of coalition to be equally likely, a particular size occurs
with a probability of (1/n). Therefore, the probability of any particular
coalition of size s containing the individual faction i, from n factions, is given
by the expression
sÿ 1!nÿ s!
n!
1
Suppose that coalition C has a ‘‘security level’’ or ‘‘characteristic function’’
denoted by $fCg, defined as the minimum benefit that coalition C can
guarantee to its member factions (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). The
security level that the remaining factions have if fi is removed from C can then
be denoted by $fCÿ ig. Therefore, the contribution that fi alone makes to C
is:
$fCg ÿ$fCÿ ig 2
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7 The Shapley value is now defined as the product of expressions (1) and (2),
summed over s from 1 to n:
Shapley value, Sfi 
P
ssÿ 1!nÿ s!
n!
$fCg ÿ$fCÿ ig 3
A pivotal faction can now be more carefully defined as follows: fi is pivotal if
and only if fi is the faction that changes Ci from a losing coalition to a winning
one. The pivotal faction is the one that brings the coalition ‘‘past the winning
post,’’ therefore the order of voting (i.e., the order in which coalitions are
formed) is crucially important.
The Shapley–Shubik Index
The Shapley–Shubik index is a friendlier variation of the Shapley value
(Cowen & Fisher, 1998; Shapley & Shubik, 1954). Suppose that a board of
governors B has n factions, which form themselves into various coalitions C
for voting purposes. Then, as before,
B  ff1; f2; f3; . . . : : fng; C  f f1; f2 . . . : :fi . . . : :fsg;
C is a subset of B, not ;
The Shapley–Shubik index is defined as follows:
SS of fi 
P
i Ci where fi is pivotalP
i Ci
4
The Shapley–Shubik index is normalised, since 0  SSfi  1, and 1
represents absolute power.
Previous Use
Shapley and Shubik (1969) famously used the index in an analysis of power in
the United Nations Security Council. Up to 1965, there were five permanent
members of the Security Council (USA, USSR, UK, France and China) and
six non-permanent members. Analysis showed that the permanent members,
who had (and still have) power of veto, had 98.7% of the power. In 1965, in an
attempt to increase the power of non-permanent members, their number was
increased to 10, but the Shapley–Shubik analysis showed that the power of the
same five permanent members had only decreased marginally, to 98.1%,
proving that membership ratios are not true reflections of actual power.
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7 Both the Shapley value and the Shapley–Shubik index will now be used to
evaluate the relative power of each faction on each of the three types of school
governing boards.
AN ANALYSIS OF POWER ON MODEL A: VOLUNTARY
MAINTAINED BOARDS
Let the five factions on the board of governors be denoted as follows:
Church trustees (4 votes): C
Education and Library Board (2 votes): L
Parent body (1 vote): P
Teaching staff (1 vote): T
Department of Education (1 vote): D
For any one particular order of C, L, P, T and D, there are:
5 One-faction or ‘‘single’’ coalitions.
20 Two-faction coalitions.
60 Three-faction coalitions.
120 Four-faction coalitions.
120 Five-faction or ‘‘grand’’ coalitions.
A little consideration reveals the following:
 None of the single coalitions is a winning one.
 8 two-faction coalitions are winning ones (they all include C).
 36 three-faction coalitions are winning (they all include C).
 All four- and grand coalitions are winning.
Consequently, there are 284 winning coalitions out of a possible 325.
The three-, four- and grand coalitions require further investigation.
Three-Faction Coalitions
There are 36 winning three-faction coalitions. If C is first, the second voter
is pivotal. If C is second or third (12 occasions each) then C itself is pivotal.
Therefore, C is pivotal 24 times; L, P, T and D are pivotal on 3 occasions
each.
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7 Four-Faction Coalitions
There are 120 four-faction coalitions (all winning). If C is first in the voting
(i.e., the first faction to take a position), then the second faction to vote is
pivotal (6 times each for L, P, T and D). If C is second, third or fourth in the
voting, then C itself is pivotal. In the case of the 24 coalitions that do not
include C, the last faction will always be the pivotal one.
Therefore, C is pivotal 72 times; L, P, T and D are pivotal on 12 occasions
each.
Grand Coalitions
In grand coalitions, the last faction to vote (i.e., to coalesce) can never be
pivotal, even if it is C. Therefore these cases reduce to the four-faction
coalition analysis outlined already.
Summary Table
Table 1 is a summary table of the extent to which each faction is pivotal in
each of the five possible coalition sizes. The two power measurements – the
Shapley value and the Shapley–Shubik index – can now be calculated for each
of the five participating factions.
The Shapley Value for Each Faction
For the Shapley value, n  5 and s  f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g. We assume that the
contribution of faction fi to each coalition in which it is pivotal, namely
$fCg ÿ$fCÿ ig, is unity; and that the contribution of fi to each unsuccess-
ful coalition is zero.
The results are summarised on Table 2.
The Shapley–Shubik Index for Each Faction
The results are summarised on Table 3.
Table 1. Summary Table for Voluntary Maintained Boards.
C pivotal L pivotal P pivotal T pivotal D pivotal Totals
Single 0 0 0 0 0 0
Two-faction 4 1 1 1 1 8
Three-faction 24 3 3 3 3 36
Four-faction 72 12 12 12 12 120
Grand 72 12 12 12 12 120
Totals 172 28 28 28 28 284
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AN ANALYSIS OF POWER ON MODEL B: CONTROLLED
SECONDARY BOARDS
Let the four factions on the board of governors be denoted as follows:
Church transferors (4 votes): C
Education and Library Board (2 votes): L
Parent body (2 votes): P
Teaching staff (1 vote): T
For any one particular order of C, L, P, and T there are:
4 One-faction or ‘‘single’’ coalitions.
12 Two-faction coalitions.
24 Three-faction coalitions.
24 Four-faction or ‘‘grand’’ coalitions.
 None of the single coalitions is a winning one.
 6 two-faction coalitions are winning ones (the ones which include C).
 All three- and grand coalitions are winning.
Table 2. Shapley Values for Voluntary Maintained Boards.
sÿ 1!nÿ s!
n! C L P T D Total
Single 1/5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Two-faction 1/20 4 1 1 1 1 8
Three-faction 1/30 24 3 3 3 3 36
Four-faction 1/20 72 12 12 12 12 120
Grand 1/5 72 12 12 12 12 120
Shapley values 19.0 3.15 3.15 3.15 3.15
Table 3. Shapley–Shubik Index for Voluntary Maintained Boards.
C pivotal L pivotal P pivotal T pivotal D pivotal
Number coalitions where
pivotal
172 28 28 28 28
Number of possible winning
coalitions
284 284 284 284 284
Shapley–Shubik 0.61 0.099 0.099 0.099 0.099
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7 Consequently, there are 54 winning coalitions out of a possible 64.
Two-Faction Coalitions
Three have C voting last and pivotal and the other three have C voting first.
Three-Faction Coalitions
There are 24 winning three-faction coalitions. If C is first to vote, the second
faction becomes pivotal (twice each for L, P and T). If C is second (6 times) or
third (6 times) in the voting, then C itself is pivotal. In the other 6 coalitions
without C, the last one to vote becomes pivotal.
Therefore, C is pivotal 12 times; L, P, T are pivotal on 4 occasions each.
Grand Coalitions
These cases reduce to the three-faction coalition analysis outlined above.
Summary Table
Table 4 is a summary table of the extent to which each faction is pivotal in
each of the five possible coalition sizes. The two actual power measurements
for each of the five participating factions can now be calculated: the Shapley
value and the Shapley–Shubik index.
The Shapley Value for Each Faction
For the Shapley value, n  4 and s  f1; 2; 3; 4g. We assume that the contri-
bution of fi to each coalition in which it is pivotal, namely$fCg ÿ$fCÿ ig,
is unity; and that the contribution of fi to each unsuccessful coalition is zero.
The results are summarised on Table 5.
The Shapley–Shubik Index for Each Faction
The results are summarised on Table 6.
Table 4. Summary Table for Controlled Secondary Boards.
C pivotal L pivotal P pivotal T pivotal Totals
Single 0 0 0 0 0
Two-faction 3 1 1 1 6
Three-faction 12 4 4 4 24
Grand 12 4 4 4 24
Totals 27 9 9 9 54
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AN ANALYSIS OF POWER ON MODEL C: A SAMPLE
OUT-OF-STATE/INTEGRATED/GRAMMAR SCHOOL BOARD
Let the five factions on the board of governors be denoted as follows:
Education and Library Board (3 votes): L
Parent body (3 votes): P
Majority religious body (2 votes): R
Minority religious body (1 vote): r
Teaching staff (2 votes): T
For any one particular order of L, P, R, r and T, there are:
5 One-faction or ‘‘single’’ coalitions.
20 Two-faction coalitions.
60 Three-faction coalitions.
120 Four-faction coalitions.
120 Five-faction or ‘‘grand’’ coalitions.
 None of the single coalitions is a winning one.
 Only two of the two-faction coalitions are winning ones (LP and PL).
 The only three-faction coalitions that are not winning are the six variations
of TrR.
Table 5. Shapley Values for Controlled Secondary Boards.
sÿ 1!nÿ s!
n!
C L P T Total
Single 1/4 0 0 0 0 0
Two-faction 1/12 3 1 1 1 6
Three-faction 1/12 12 4 4 4 24
Grand 1/4 12 4 4 4 24
Shapley values 4.25 1.42 1.42 1.42
Table 6. Shapley–Shubik Index for Controlled Secondary Boards.
C pivotal L pivotal P pivotal T pivotal
Number coalitions where pivotal 27 9 9 9
Number of possible winning coalitions 54 54 54 54
Shapley–Shubik 0.50 0.167 0.167 0.167
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7  All four- and grand coalitions are winning.
Consequently, there are 296 winning coalitions out of a possible 325.
The three-, four- and grand coalitions require further investigation.
Three-Faction Coalitions
There are 54 winning three-faction coalitions. Twelve of these finish with
voting from L; 12 with voting from P; and 10 with voting from each of R, T and
r. Of these last 30, 6 start with PL or LP. Therefore, L and P are each pivotal in
15 three-faction coalitions; and R, T and r are each pivotal in 8.
Four-Faction Coalitions
There are 120 four-faction coalitions (all winning) and in one-fifth of them, L
votes first. One-quarter of those 24 times, P votes next, so P will be pivotal in
these 6 coalitions. R, T and r (in any order) will vote first on a further 12
occasions and half that time, P will be pivotal.
In all other coalitions, the pivotal position will be third in the voting, and P will
be in this position on 24 occasions. In total then, P will be pivotal for 36 coalitions.
A similar analysis reveals that L is also pivotal for 36 four-faction coali-
tions; and R, T and r are each pivotal in 16.
Grand Coalitions
Since grand coalitions have 11 votes and the largest faction commands only 3,
the last faction voting can never be pivotal. Therefore, these cases reduce to
the four-faction coalition analysis outlined above.
Summary Table
Table 7 is a summary table of the extent to which each faction is pivotal in
each of the five possible coalition sizes. The two actual power measurements –
the Shapley value and the Shapley–Shubik index – for each of the five partic-
ipating factions can now be calculated.
The Shapley Value for Each Faction
For the Shapley value, n  5 and s  f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g. We assume that the contri-
bution of fi to each coalition in which it is pivotal, namely$fCgÿ$fCÿ ig, is
unity; and that the contribution of fi to each unsuccessful coalition is zero.
The results are summarised on Table 8.
The Shapley–Shubik Index for Each Faction
The results are summarised on Table 9.
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SUMMARY
The Relative Power of Major and Minor Factions
Voluntary Maintained School Boards
The church nominees have four seats on the board, and one each for parent,
teacher and Department of Education (DENI) representatives. The Education
Table 8. Shapley Values for Integrated/Grammar/Out-Of-State Boards.
sÿ 1!nÿ s!
n!
L P R T r Total
Single 1/5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Two-faction 1/20 1 1 0 0 0 2
Three-faction 1/30 15 15 8 8 8 54
Four-faction 1/20 36 36 16 16 16 120
Grand 1/5 36 36 16 16 16 120
Shapley values 9.55 9.55 4.27 4.27 4.27
Table 9. Shapley–Shubik Index for Integrated/Grammar/Out-Of-State Boards.
L pivotal P pivotal R pivotal T pivotal r pivotal
Number coalitions where
pivotal 88 88 40 40 40
Number of possible winning
coalitions 296 296 296 296 296
Shapley–Shubik 0.297 0.297 0.135 0.135 0.135
Table 7. Summary Table for Integrated/Grammar/Out-Of-State Boards.
L pivotal P pivotal R pivotal T pivotal r pivotal Totals
Single 0 0 0 0 0 0
Two-faction 1 1 0 0 0 2
Three-faction 15 15 8 8 8 54
Four-faction 36 36 16 16 16 120
Grand 36 36 16 16 16 120
Totals 88 88 40 40 40 296
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7 and Library Board (ELB) has two seats. However, analysis reveals that church
nominees have (more than) six times the power of any of the other factions!
Controlled Secondary School Boards
The church nominees have four seats on the board, to two each for parent and
ELB representatives. There is one teacher seat. Analysis from both indices
reveals that church nominees have three times the power of any of the other
factions.
A Sample Out-Of-State/Integrated/Grammar School Board
The Shapley value and the Shapley–Shubik index both reveal that the power of
the ELB faction and the parent body is (approximately) 2.2 times that of each
of the other three factions. This is a truer reflection of power than the ratio of
memberships; 3:2 in the case of teachers and majority religious factions; 3:1 in
the case of minority religious body.
The distribution of power is most equal on the sample Out-of-state/
Integrated/Grammar school board and most skewed in favour of the majority
on (Roman Catholic) Voluntary Maintained boards – twice as much as the
skew towards the majority in (Protestant) Controlled Secondary boards. Both
churches, but particularly the church representatives on Voluntary Maintained
boards, retain considerable power despite the illusion of empowerment.
The Relative Power of the Minor Factions
Voluntary Maintained School Boards
The minor factions all have equal power. The ELB does not have twice that of
parents, teachers or DENI, as might be assumed. This is a reflection of the fact
that each of the four minor factions is equally ‘‘useful’’ in forming winning
coalitions.
Controlled Secondary School Boards
The minor factions all have equal power on Controlled Secondary boards too –
a minor pleasant surprise for teachers, but a disappointment to parents and
the ELB.
A Sample Out-Of-State/Integrated/Grammar School Board
Both indices reveal that the power of the minority religious body is the same as
that of the majority religious body, although first impressions would suggest
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7 that the latter was twice as powerful. This may be significant in a Northern
Ireland context, as it may encourage cooperation while maintaining a
countenance of proportionality for the participants.
The Payoff for Winning Coalitions
If the Shapley value was used to award payoffs commensurate with contri-
bution, as suggested by ‘‘minimum resource theory’’ (Gamson, 1961), then it
would be a way of achieving a market-like outcome where a market did not
exist per se – such as with school boards. However, members of school boards
are not rewarded like that, if at all, and the motivational payoff for the pivotal
factions can best be understood in terms of political influence and control.
Experience suggests that the payoff for a winning coalition is simply that its
member factions are perceived to be influential and share, to a greater or lesser
extent, the power and control associated with winning.
The Order of Voting or Coalescence
Voluntary Maintained School Boards
Table 10 reveals that minority factions on Voluntary Maintained boards are
least powerful when voting third, that is when coalescing as the third party to a
coalition. Voting second is slightly better than voting third (57% of the time
the faction will be pivotal, compared to 43%). It does not matter so much for
the four church trustees.
Voting first or last (i.e., being the first faction to take a position or the last to
coalesce) means that the faction cannot be pivotal, so there is a commensurate
loss of power in so doing.
Controlled Secondary School Boards
Table 11 reveals that, even for the majority faction (the church transferors),
there is no great advantage to coalescing second as opposed to third (56 to
44%), but again, factions should avoid voting first or last.
Table 10. Most Pivotal Position in the Voting Sequence for Voluntary Maintained Board Factions.
% times pivotal in 2nd % times pivotal in 3rd % times pivotal in 4th
C 37 35 28
L 57 0 43
P 57 0 43
T 57 0 43
D 57 0 43
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A Sample Out-Of-State/Integrated/Grammar School Board
Analysis reveals that a faction is most powerfully placed when it is the third
faction to make its position known. This is particularly so for the three minor
factions, as Table 12 shows. For these to be pivotal, they must coalesce third in
the winning coalition. Even for the two majority factions, there is considerable
advantage to voting third in the order, and second is slightly better than fourth.
As always, factions should avoid voting first or last.
Minimal Winning Coalitions
Coalescing with the pivotally positioned faction is the next-best thing to being
pivotal oneself. If it is assumed that there is no political reward for losing, and
that all factions want to share the spoils of winning, then the strategy should
always be to end up on the winning side. Unfortunately, this is opposed by an
equal and opposite desire on the part of those who have already formed a
winning coalition not to accept superfluous members! Just as there is no
incentive for the last voting faction to dissent, there is no incentive for the first
three or four factions to form grand coalitions, since the last-joining faction is
never ‘‘important.’’
This idea is analogous to Riker’s ‘‘minimal winning coalition theory’’
(1962), which states that if a coalition is large enough to win it should avoid
Table 11. Most Pivotal Position in the Voting Sequence for Controlled Secondary Board
Factions.
% times pivotal in 2nd % times pivotal in 3rd
C 56 44
L 56 44
P 56 44
T 56 44
Table 12. Most Pivotal Position in the Voting Sequence for Integrated/Grammar/Out-Of-State
Board Factions.
% times pivotal in 2nd % times pivotal in 3rd % times pivotal in 4th
L 18 68 14
P 18 68 14
R 0 100 0
T 0 100 0
r 0 100 0
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7 accepting additional factions, since these new members will demand a share in
the payoff. The concept of minimal winning coalitions forms the basis for a
power index not used in this paper, the Deegan–Packel index, but which may
be of interest to some readers (Deegan & Packel, 1978).
Other Applications
While this discussion has concentrated on school governance, analysis of this
sort can easily be applied to other competitive voting situations, both within
education and without. For example, similar theory has been used to analyse
voting power in the European Union. When its forerunner was set up by the
Treaty of Rome in 1958, there were five member states, of which Luxembourg
was one. Luxembourg had 1 vote out of a total of 17, but it has subsequently
been shown that no coalition of member states ever needed Luxembourg in
order to achieve a majority. In effect, Luxembourg was a powerless bystander
in terms of competitive voting, though no doubt it benefited in other ways
from membership of the ‘‘grand coalition.’’
Implications for Forming Committees
There are some additional practical implications for how committees are
constituted, whether they are dissemination forums or statutory decision-
making bodies.
 The numerical voting strength of a faction on a committee is not a reflection
of its real power. This can lead to frustration, but it can also be a source of
stability.
 Committees should be constituted so as to reflect accurately the desired (or
entitled) proportional representation.
 School managers need to be aware of the possibility of disproportionate
voting power, particularly when setting up structures for staff involvement
in decision-making. Staff committees, which appear to reflect the relative
sizes of different subject groupings, for example, may be dangerously skewed.
CONCLUSION
This paper considered two measurements of power; the Shapley value and the
Shapley–Shubik index. There are others, such as the Johnston Index
(Johnston, 1978), which looks at the (reciprocal of the) number of critical
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7 factions; the Deegan–Packel index (1978), which looks at the (reciprocal of
the) number of minimal factions; and the Banzhaf index (1965), which looks
at the number of coalitions in which a faction is both critical and pivotal.
None is any better suited to the circumstances of school governance than the
two used in this paper, but they make interesting reading for those who wish to
apply game theory to more complicated situations.
All power indices are limited, in a small way, by the axioms and
assumptions already noted in the text. These include the assumption that
factions always vote sincerely and along rational self-interest lines; that voting
is open; that coalitions have not been pre-arranged; that all coalitions are
equally likely to appear; and that there is a reward for being part of a winning
coalition. The appropriateness of these assumptions is, of course, a matter for
judgement. Each faction judges the properties of a particular solution accord-
ing to the favourableness of its outcomes, not by its innate attractiveness.
Therefore, power is ultimately judged by its actual exercise, rather than its
perceived distribution. Perceptions can be mistaken, as this paper has hope-
fully shown.
Power is the exercise of authority and influence, and in schools this is
largely the remit of the governing body, with the head as chief executive. The
constitution of these powerful committees is sometimes taken as a reflection
of something deeper happening in society generally, as notions about
democratisation and empowerment are transferred to and from school settings.
However, the perception of how power is distributed is often flattering to
deceive. The reality is often disappointing. Despite minority stakeholder
representation on boards of governors and the like, the formal providers
of education still retain power out of all proportion to their membership. It is
for others to decide whether this is desirable or not, but it is unlikely that
power has been fundamentally redistributed in recent times, as is sometimes
claimed.
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